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LYNTON K. CALDWELL*

Emerging Boundary Environmental
Challenges and Institutional Issues:
Canada and the United States
Circumstances characterizing the two international boundaries of
the United States, north and south, have differed in three significant ways:
cultural, historical, and geographical. These factors have influenced how
transboundary regional issues have been perceived and evaluated. Institutional responses to the environmental challenges of each region have
been shaped and limited by these factors and by subsets of these factors
inherent in the relationships of each region to their broader national contexts. Prominent among these are factors of demography, or populations,
and of social structures.
Regions are variously defined depending upon the criteria
selected. For our purposes here, transboundary regions are considered as
bioregions-that is, areas of general ecological similarity that frequently
coincide with economic similarities, e.g., the maritime areas of New
England and Canada, the Great Lakes, the Great Plains, and the Pacific
Northwest. Between the United States and Mexico, the Rio Grande Valley
and the Sonora Desert are identifiable transboundary regions.
Policy decisions and institutional arrangements for each transboundary region are often affected by national political considerations,
extraneous to the regions, and by problems specific to each region. The
-national governments, parties to agreements pertaining to the environmental problems of each region, are preoccupied with a broad diversity of
issues among which regional transboundary affairs are only randomly
high on political agendas. Concern for rights of national sovereignty, prerogatives of state and provincial governments, and bureaucratic interests
of federal agencies have been limiting factors for transboundary institutions. The International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) and the
International Joint Commission (IJC) as a matter of practical consideration
have been given responsibilities for review and negotiation of transboundary environmental issues, but do not have political or policing (i.e.,
enforcement) authority. Each boundary region is divided between two
federal administrative systems and their subdivisions. No comprehensive
*Lynton Caldwell is Professor of Political Science and Professor of Public Environmental

Affairs at Indiana University.
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or political authority presides over the environmental problems of the
Great Lakes Basin or the Rio Grande Valley. In less complex times binational oversight of regional problems presented few serious difficulties.
But as transboundary transactions have escalated, particularly in the
Great Lakes region, nongovernmental environmental organizations are
beginning to urge consideration of new forms of coherent, responsive
organization and policymaking, which means new forms of governance.
A consequence of these circumstances is that the national governments, having not given attention to the problems of the regions commensurate with their intrinsic environmental importance, tend now to be
resistant to moves toward alternative governance. The governments are
not prepared to acquiesce in the resolution of regional problems by politically autonomous institutions. Particular policy issues continue to be relegated to those national departments and bureaus that have national
responsibility for the types of issues involved. National agencies characteristically have interests both broader and different from transboundary
issues per se. Thus binational management of regional resources tends to
be issue-specific, uncoordinated, and subordinate to an agency's bureaucratic interests. The national agencies, moreover, are invariably jealous of
their jurisdictions. And so the question arises, will these disparate and
largely ad hoc institutional arrangements be adequate to deal with the
challenges of the future? Perhaps not, but the status and structure of more
effective alternatives are not clear, nor is the timing of probable change
forcing events safely predictable.
HOW THE REGIONS DIFFER
In comparing the regions and the situations confronting their
boundary commissions, three differences have significant bearing upon
the suitability of institutional arrangements for environmental policy and
management.
The first is the situation of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem as the
unique and most significant environmental entity on the Canadian-American boundary, and the most demanding responsibility of the International Joint Commission. The Great Lakes have no counterpart in the
Mexican-American boundary region. They present problems comparable
to those encountered in other international regional bodies of water, notably the Baltic, Black, and Mediterranean seas. The lakes are regional
seas-hydrologically, ecologically, and economically interconnected, fractionally managed, and frequently mismanaged.
Although the jurisdiction of the IJC extends along the 5,000-mile
length of the Canadian-American international boundary, its role in relation to the lakes is more comprehensive, more particularized, and espe-

Winter 1993]

EMERGING BOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES

11

cially more complex. It shares responsibility for the lakes with other
binational bodies, notably the Great Lakes Fisheries Commission and the
Governors and Premiers of the Great Lakes States and Provinces.1 Of
greater significance for institutional responsibilities in the basin are the
roles of the administrative agencies of the two federal governments and of
the states and provinces. If multi-jurisdictional coordination is necessary
to the basinwide ecosystem approach declared by the Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreements, the task of obtaining it is truly formidable. Beyond
the lakes, issues affecting transboundary waters come and go, but the
lakes remain a primary and continuing concern of the International Joint
Commission; no other agency has so comprehensive a responsibility for
this protection. Yet the responsibility has been treated with caution rather
than with foresight, and at times has been politically compromised.
The second difference is cultural, evident in the large and active
binational nongovernmental organized environmental citizen concern in
the Great Lakes region. Linguistic and cultural differences pose no serious
barrier to transboundary cooperation. There is no legacy of mistrust comparable to that between Mexicans and Anglos. The nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), many of which are binational in membership,
develop their own agendas and communication networks. 2 They undertake to inform a larger public regarding Great Lakes issues and then cooperatively to lobby their respective governments for reform. They have
generally understood the limitations of the IJC, but have hoped through it
to send messages to the national authorities which many of their members
see as evasive and 'foot-dragging' on Great Lakes issues. But NGO leaders
are beginning to question whether politically appointed commissioners
are likely to take positions at variance with the governments that
appointed them. At the 1991 IJC biennial meeting on the Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement held at Traverse City, Michigan, eleven United
States and Canadian NGOs made formal presentations and issued press
releases critical of the IJC and the Parties in their failure to implement
declared objectives; for example, Great Lakes United put out a pamphlet
1. M. Donahue, InstitutionalArrangementsfor Great Lakes Management, in Perspectives on
Ecosystem Management for the Great Lakes 115-39 (L. Caldwell ed.,1988).
2. Publications on environmental NCOs and public participation in governmental policymaking are extensive. Among those especially pertinent to the Great Lakes are S. Lerner,
Environmental Constituency-Building;Local Initiatives and Voluntary Stewardship, 13:3 Alternatives 55-60 (Sept.-Oct. 1986); International Joint Comm'n, Great Lakes Science Advisory Bd.,
Public Participation and Remedial Action Plans: An Overview of Approaches and Issues
Arising from RAP Coordinator's Forums 33 (1990); Decisions for the Great Lakes (A. Misener
& G. Daniel eds., 1982); New Groups Signal Growing Great Lakes Regional Identity, 2 Great
Lakes Rep. (Mar.-Apr. 1985)(pages unnmbered); and Public Involvement: Planning and
Implementing Public Involvement Programs(1988). Of particular importance is J. Manno's
Advocacy and Diplomacy::Non-GovernmentalOrganizationsand the Canada-U.S. Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement, Paper Presented at a Seminar on Int'l NGOs-The Great Lakes and

Beyond (Oct. 1991) (forthcoming).
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entitled Broken Agreement: The Failureof the United States and Canada to
Implement the Great Lakes Water QualityAgreement.
The third difference is water "surplus" throughout most of the
Canadian-American boundary region, and water scarcity along the Mexican boundary. Indeed water as a resource is a unifying factor in both
regions. In the Great Lakes region, opposition to diversion of its waters for
agricultural and urbanization in the western and southwestern states
inspired the 1985 Charter for the Great Lakes by Governors and Premiers
of the Great Lakes States and Provinces. When present trends are projected into the future, it seems highly probable that water as a limiting factor will be a source of political contention. If America's fixation on growth
continues and diversion of Great Lakes water is obstructed, the ghost of
NAWAPA (North American Water and Power Alliance) ma7 rise reincarnate, assuming that the energy to activate it can be found. This colossal
scheme to move vast quantities of water from the Canadian Rockies to
water-deficit United States would create a transboundary environmental
problem of truly continental proportions. Its political-economic implications would be no less portentous. If entertained seriously in the United
States it would possibly be the biggest single challenge yet to the IJC, especially were the project to arouse major opposition in Canada.
IMMANENT CHALLENGE
Because of the geopolitical circumstances of the Canadian-American borderlands, the institutional challenges of the Great Lakes are distinctive and distinguishable from all other areas. Of the emerging
transboundary environmental challenges in North America, those of the
Great Lakes are far greater, more complex, and of continuing duration.
The focus of this essay will therefore be restricted to the institutional
issues of the Great Lakes Basin and will not extend to environmental challenges along the rest of the international boundary. These challenges are
important ecologically, economically, and politically, but they do not
appear to present institutional problems comparable to those of the Great
Lakes Basin, and existing institutional arrangements under the supervision of the IJC seem generally adequate to the need.
Two periodicities confront Great Lakes decisionmakers: shortterm and long-term. Short-term crises (e.g., chemical spills) may require
one-time-only attention by particular agencies (e.g., Coast Guard and
United States Corps of Engineers). Meeting long-term or immanent challenges could require the coordinated effort of a large number of public
3. NAWAPA: A Continental Water System-Symposium, 23 Bull. of the Atomic Scientists 827 (Sept. 1967); R. Lewis, NAWAPA: Water for the Year 2000, 21 Bull. of the Atomic Scientist:
9-11 (May 1965).
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agencies (e.g., elimination of toxic substances, assessing trends affecting
water quality, or restoration of damaged ecosystems). Short-term crises,
however, if not addressed in a timely and effective manner, may become
long-term problems. Invasions by exotic species (e.g., sea lampreys, alewives, and zebra mussels) are cases inpoint. Short-term crises may occur
paradoxically because long-term or continuing challenges have not been
anticipated or effectively addressed. For example, oil or chemical spills
may occur because the governments have failed to establish adequate preventive controls over potentially hazardous shipping practices.
A "challenge" in this context is a situation or trend having
adverse effects or consequences for the quality of life and to which preventive or remedial response is possible. The challenge is to the persons
affected, and to those responsible for response, and may include the whole
society in the region. A whole society cannot be called to account, so it is
necessary to fix accduntability more precisely. But the present fractionated
jurisdiction enables governments to evade the consequences of institutional irresponsibility.
In some cases challenges may be localized geographically and
particularized by issue, by activity, or by people affected. But whatever
the incidence of the challenge, the problems encountered in a large and
complex region such as the Great Lakes Basin eventually involve public
agencies having jurisdiction and responsibility in relation to one or more
aspects of the challenge. Few if any of the challenges to the lakes can be
met solely by private means, although nongovernmental volunteer efforts
may help greatly to overcome difficulties that do not require legal remedies. NCOs have been playing increasingly important roles in identifying
emerging challenges, in monitoring the effectiveness of governmental and
private responses, in pressuring the sometimes reluctant public agencies
to action, and in preserving and protecting natural areas.
As previously noted, the one public agency with broadly inclusive responsibility for the state of the lakes is the International Joint Com-5
mission.4 Established pursuant to the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909,
the functions and political significance of the Commission have grown in
response to the challenges of circumstances and events, until today it is
possible that popular expectations concerning its role as an agent of public
policy may exceed its legal and political mandate. The two federal governments (the "Parties" in official nomenclature) established the IJC as an
agent of limited jurisdiction to supervise the observance of obligations
assumed under the Boundary Waters Treaty. Three commissioners respectively from Canada and the United States are appointed politically to rep4. R. Spencer et. al., eds. The International Joint Commission-Seventy Years On. (1981);
J. Carroll, Environmental Diplomacy: An Examination and Prospective of Canadian-U.S.
Transboundary Environmental Relations, (1983); B.Sadler. The InternationalJoint Commission:
Past and Future,4 Transboundary Resources Rep.: 1-2 (Winter 1990).
5. 36 Stat. 2448 (1909), reprintedin Caldwell, supra note 1, at 345-54 app. a.
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resent their governments, although in practice, the Commission has
customarily acted on the merits of the issues before it on a nonpartisan
basis.
Of the challenges confronting the Commission, the most complex
and comprehensive are those officially recognized and defined by the
Water Quality Agreements of 1972, 1978, and Protocol of 1987.6 Identification and definition of these challenges is provided primarily in the Great
Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978. But there is a paradox in the
terms of this Agreement which, in itself, is a challenge to the policies of the
Parties, and a jurisdictional problem for the IJC. The terms of the 1978
Agreement and 1987 Protocol faithfully reflect the "split level" commitment of the Parties toward meeting the challenges of the lakes. Water
quality issues fit the traditional IJC adjudicatory functions. A basinwide
ecosystem approach to lake management practices and functions is not
easily accommodated by the present binational arrangements and is
resisted operationally even though endorsed rhetorically by the IJC.
As a general proposition the 1978 Agreement identifies its scope
as "the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem." Article I defines this term to mean
"the interacting components of air, land, water and living organisms,
including humans, within the drainage basin of the St. Lawrence River at
or upstream from the point at which this river becomes the international
boundary between Canada and the United States." This holistic delineation of the environmental parameters of policy is both reiterated and
implied in the Protocol of 1987. For example, Annex 2 states that "Remedial Action Plans and Lakewide Management Plans shall employ a systematic and comprehensive ecosystem approach to restoring and
protecting beneficial uses in Areas of Concern or in open lake waters."
This comprehensive approach, moreover, was endorsed in the 1985 Charter for the Great Lakes adopted jointly on 11 February 1985 by the Governors and Premiers of the Great Lakes States and Provinces. Principle I of
the Charter "Integrity of the Great Lakes Basin" declared that:
The planning and management of the water resources
of the Great Lakes Basin should recognize and be
founded upon the integrity of the natural resources
and ecosystem of the Great Lakes Basin. The water
resources of the Basin transcend political boundaries
within the Basin, and should be recognized and treated
as a single hydrologic system. In managing the Great
Lakes Basin waters, the natural resources and ecosystem of7the Basin should be considered as a unified
whole.
6. Int'l Joint Comm'n (1989), Revised Great Lakes Quality Agreement of 1978, amended by
Protocol of Nov. 18,1987, art. (g), at 5. See also excerpts from 1978 Agreement in Caldwell,
supra note 1, at 359-61, app. B.
7. The Great Lakes Charter,reprintedin Caldwell, supra note 1, at app. C.
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However in moving from the general ecosystem approach to
operational specifics, the 1978 Agreement and 1987 Protocol reveal a common defect of the virtues strongly marked in the technological societies of
the twentieth century. The economic and technological strength of Canadian and American societies lies primarily in their ability to apply means
to the solution of specific problems, and only very secondarily to do so
within the context of comprehensively considered ends. Of course an
abundance of cheap, accessible natural resources has been an essential
condition for the economic and technological success of the two countries.
But historically the prospect of inexhaustible resources and endless frontiers has diverted attention from the long-term consequences of a cornucopian approach to nature's bounty.
People tend to do what they do best and to focus on present problems with relatively little consideration for the long-term implications of
their preferred solutions. Priorities tend to respond to the political pressures of the day and to reflect the short-term biases especially characteristic of the present state of democratic politics. In consequence, science and
technology are mobilized primarily to identify, measure and evaluate specific hazards to environmental quality. Thus time and resources are allocated to achieve tangible results in measurement of mass balances of
contaminants in the lakes, and to ascertain thresholds of significance, in
preference to the investigation of ways of eliminating the contaminants at
their source. Virtual elimination of toxicants has been a declared top priority of the International Joint Commission and the Parties. But the route
toward realizing this priority has been indirect, protracted, and complicated by legal provisions regarding the burden of proof of culpability for
contamination.
The tendency to do what we do best, and also to avoid politically
inconvenient controversy, pushes the policy process toward the panacea
of "the technological fix." The less a plausible policy intrudes upon the
interests of individuals and groups, especially their financial interests, the
more attractive it is politically. Democratic policymaking tends to favor
compromise solutions. In matters of production, consumption, and disposal of residuals, control, selective and graduated, is generally preferred
to outright prohibition or to mandatory use of benign alternatives at
higher monetary cost. Arguments over how clean is clean, how pure is
pure, and what levels of exposure are tolerable characterize debates over
control. Issues of acceptable risk arise and reflect popular assessments of
hazards that may be disproportionate to the probabilities. 8 Attitudes may
be influenced by the extent to which a hazard might be evaded. For exam8. On risk see EPA, Reducing Risk Setting Priorities and Strategies for Environmental Protection (Report of the Science Advisory Bd, Relative Risk Reduction Comm.); C. Gillette & J.
Krier. Risk, Courts, and Agencies 138 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1027 (1990) (heavily documented with
many references to analysis of risk).
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ple,the contamination offish in the Great Lakes poses no direct hazard to
anyone who does not eat the fish; the risk is voluntary. But atmospheric
fall-out, acidic or carcinogenic, cannot be evaded by persons residing in its
path; the risk is involuntary.
Public response to immanent challenges is further deflected or
diminished by absence of a consensual vision of a preferred future. In contemporary open societies there is an abundance of popular concern over
possible futures. That concern, however, tends to resemble the outlook of
the Kiplinger Washington Letter Changing Times, which forecasts "What's
Ahead?" or John Naisbitt's popular Megatrends.9 These and similar publications purport to assist adaptation to an unfolding but partially predictable future. It is difficult and may be impossible for a populous and
diversified society to agree on a common future or even to plan toward
relatively limited ends for which there are no obvious or generally acceptable means. Among conservative and libertarian elements of the population in Canada and the United States, there is strong aversion to planning
at the societal level. The shaping of an environmental future through public planning, from their viewpoint, is a very bad idea, and in any case
beyond human rational capability. The "practical" approach to problems
of the lakes is issue by issue as they emerge-no grand, basinwide plans
that, in any case, are regarded as not practical or feasible.

INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
Future-directed incremental planning is, however, an accepted
practice in governmental as well as in private sectors. Reconciliation and
coordination of policy and planning is another matter, especially in societies in which competition and contest are widely accepted behaviors. The
competitive mind-set tends to view issues fractionally and to focus on
contestants, on winners or losers, rather than on probable outcomes and
implications of the contest. This linear approach to interactive multiplex
relationships is ineffective when applied to large, complex, long-term
problems. It is poorly adapted to policymaking on the scale of the Great
Lakes basinwide ecosystem.
To regard these observations merely as abstract philosophical
speculation would be to miss the point that they characterize the present
societal foundation for whatever policies or procedures are adopted to
meet the challenges of the future for the Great Lakes, and indeed for all of
the transboundary waters and their more inclusive ecosystems. But evidence confirmed independently by numbers of opinion analysts indicates
a progressive shift of public opinion in nearly all societies of advanced
9. J. Naisbitt, Megatrends: Ten New Directions Transforming Our Lives (1982);J. Naisbitt
with P. Abusdene, Megatrends 2000: Ten New Directions for the 1990s (1990).
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techno-scientific capability toward more ecologically informed policies
and toward a greater weighing for environmental quality in relation to
economic interests. 10 This attitudinal shift toward what has been called
the New Environmental Paradigm (NEP) has been evident in the growth
of membership in environmental organizations in the United States and
Canada. It has also been evident in vigorous popular representation at the
public meetings of the IJC, notably at its reports to the public on implementation of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements held in Toledo,
Ohio, November 1987, in Hamilton, Ontario, October 1989, and in
Traverse City, Michigan, September 1991.11 Paradoxically, these representations were followed by increased official emphasis on the role of the
states and provinces and the Parties. From one viewpoint this might
appear to be a positive response; but from another it could be seen as
counteracting regional initiatives by strengthening the hands of national
agencies that hitherto had been less than vigorous in leading toward
water quality and basin-wide ecosystem objectives.
The fundamental paradox of binational policy for the CanadianAmerican transboundary environmental issues is that the goals of policy
to which the Parties to the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements have
expressly committed themselves are achievable only through a degree of
coordinated action that existing institutional arrangements are unlikely to
provide. Moreover, as popular impatience for results and acceptance of
the need for a more coordinative and comprehensive approach to policy
grow, the Parties appear to be moving in a retrograde direction. The 1987
Protocol to the 1978 Water Quality Agreement enhanced the role of the
states, the provinces, and the Parties in the implementation of the Agreement. Subsequent decisions by the Parties have continued this trend.12 If
the official role of the IJC has not been significantly diminished by this tendency, neither has it generally been expanded to respond to growing public expectations. If the Parties, for a number of political reasons, are
unobtrusively trying to roll back the IJC to its relatively obscure status of
fifty years ago, neither the commissioners nor those speaking for the Parties would be likely to admit it.
The internal politics of Great Lakes management have not been
apparent to the concerned public; its motivators and prime movers officiate in Ottawa and Washington and do not appear in open meetings to con10. R. Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (1990); L. Milbrath, Environmentalists: Vanguard for a New Society (1984).
11. Int'l Joint Comm'n, Fifth Biennial Report on Great Lakes Water Quality pts. I & II,
(1989/1990); and G. Thornburn, 1991 Biennial Meeting Brings Diverse Interests Together
Focus on International Joint Commission Activities 1 (Nov.-Dec. 1991).
12. See infra note 13. Also provisions of the Clean Air Act amendments of November 15,
1990, Public Law 101-549, Atmospheric Deposition to Great Lakes and Coastal Waters, 104
Stat. 2556,5374-5376, and amendment to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of November 16,1990, Public Law 101-596. Great Lakes Critical Programs Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 3001.
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firm, deny, or explain national policies. The preference for partially
decentralized implementation through duly constituted conventional
units of government has been perceived by some observers as a bias of relatively conservative administrations in Ottawa and Washington against
centralized regional governance and institutional innovation. This bias, to
the extent that it exists, is congenial to the line agencies, especially in the
United States. The United States Army Corps of Engineers, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Coast Guard, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, the Departments of Agriculture and Interior, and the Department of State would hardly act in character if they welcomed the growth of a coordinative authority for the Great Lakes 13
to which
their own planning and decisionmaking might be subordinated
The sovereignty argument also plays to a not inconsiderable audience in both Canada and the United States. As often happens elsewhere
and on other issues, the sovereignty issue, like the "we need more
research" syndrome, is often an alibi for inaction. Conservative apprehension might also be aroused by the prospect of substantial increases in mandatory public spending should a determined effort be made to achieve
water quality goals at an early date. Liberal critics might resist budget
allocations that could conceivably preempt funds otherwise available for
favored social programs.
We have today a large body of statutory laws, administrative regulations, programmatic missions and public policies, general and specific,
pertaining to the Great Lakes. If this body of legislation has indeed been
codified, clarified as to status and intent, and so far as possible reconciled
for consistency, its existence remains unaccountably obscure. With this
information as a practical matter unavailable, one can do little more than
guess at the adequacy of law and administrative structure to safeguard
the lakes. Without this information in generally comprehensible form, it
would be unreasonably difficult for the public to know what institutional
configuration might best protect the integrity and renewability of the
lakes.

13. The United States General Accounting Office has issued several reviews of U.S. implementation of the Water Quality Agreements. For its findings, somewhat mixed, see: Report
to the Congress of the United States: A More Comprehensive Approach Is Needed to Clean
Up the Great Lakes (CED-63, May 21, 1982) ; Report to the Secretary of State: International
Joint Commission Water Quality Activities Need Greater U.S. Government Support and
Involvement (GAO/CED 82-97, June 23,1982), and Report to the Chairman, Committee on
Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate: Need to Reassess U.S. Participation in the International
Joint Commission (GAO/NSIAD-89-164). See also United States Environmental Protection
Agency, U.S. Progress in Implementing the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement: Annual
Report to Congress, 1988. Chicago, Illinois: EPA Great Lakes National Program Office; (attention given to interagency coordination).
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INTERAGENCY CONSEQUENCES
One consequence of official ambiguity on transboundary environpolicies
has been the tacit devolution of decisionmaking to subnamental
tional units of government-notably to the States and Provinces. One
factor in this ambiguity is inherent in the Water Quality Agreements themselves, which define their scope to be the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem
including "... the interacting components of air, land, water and living
organisms including man ... but which in operational detail are con-

cerned almost wholly with water." Air pollution has long been a point of
contention along the international border, and the reluctance of the United
States to deal with the acid rain issue led to a number of State-Province
14
agreements in default of timely and effective federal action.
Present institutional arrangements and growing public demands
for action on priorities for the Great Lakes could easily accentuate the
"turf" rivalries of the federal agencies in Canada and the United States. In
Canada the relationship between the federal government in Ottawa and
the single large and powerful Province of Ontario could be complicated
over decisions concerning who is responsible for what. A formal agreement between the Canadian government and the Province has presumably clarified respective responsibilities. In the United States the situation
is less clear. In the United States it would be exceptional if there were no
tensions among the federal agencies and the states regarding their roles in
the Great Lakes basin.
In Canada the concerns of Ontario (richest and most populous
province) in the future of the lakes would appear to be more conducive to
addressing the costs and benefits of restoration and protection than is the
case in the United States where the eight Great Lakes states have not
formed a joint and concerted effort to obtain political and financial concessions from the federal government comparable to the lobby for subsidized
water by Congressional representatives from the western states.
Because interagency differences are usually aired behind closed
doors, their existence and significance are largely conjectural. If they exist,
they may or may not affect implementation of the larger objectives
declared by the governments for the Great Lakes. However, if all were
threatened by some loss of independent action in fulfilling their missions
in the lakes, they might be expected to bring their common cause on
behalf of national interests to the White House staff, the Office of Management and Budget, and relevant committees of the Congress. This closing
of ranks is unlikely to be a public event and if it in fact occurred it would

14. See the "indefinite extension of the treaty of 1889." 59 Stat. 1219, USTS 994, (Article II,
Feb. 3, 1944).
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more likely be inferred from a pattern of high-level decisionmaking than
from any explicit statement of policy.
Even in theory, it is not easy to assess the adequacy of present
legal and administrative arrangements for meeting future challenges in
the Great Lakes. The assumption of greater responsibility by the Parties,
States and Provinces for implementing the Water Quality Agreements and
Protocol, however desirable for specific action, is not the course of action
most likely to achieve a basinwide ecosystemic approach to Great Lakes
problems. In the long run, popular dissatisfaction with the rate of progress
toward goal achievement will probably be the crude test of organizational
effectiveness. Should present trends toward accentuating the responsibilities of the Parties and subnational jurisdictions continue, this dissatisfaction may well focus on the national governments.
One consequence of a greater role for the Parties in implementing
the Agreements is that in each government the departments concerned
with foreign affairs would be the lead agencies in interagency decisionmaking. The substance of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements is
hardly within their areas of expertise. The American Department of State,
for example, is a watchdog for national sovereignty. Its personnel are more
often lawyers than scientists. The extent of its concern for Canada may be
inferred from the relegating of Canada to a bureau concerned chiefly with
European affairs. Prima facie, one might infer a cautious legalistic
approach to fulfilling the commitments of the Agreements. This might be
an unfair prejudgment, but even with the best of intent in Washington, it
strains credulity to believe that an interagency effort is likely to produce a
coordinated approach to an objective that can be no more than a relatively
secondary priority on most agency agendas.
The Parties are, in fact, many different government agencies. The
eight states and Ontario are answerable primarily to their own constituencies. So who speaks for the lakes? Hardly the governments. The organized
public for Great Lakes policy, although divided by membership, is united
in a concern for the whole Great Lakes system. These citizen groups have
looked to the IJC as the official agency of the Parties through which they
might send messages to the governments. Some people have looked to the
IJC for services as ombudsman, to act as mediator between the public and
the agencies, but with authority to call the agencies to account on matters
of policy and decisionmaking. This expectation has never been realistic.
Observers inclined to cynicism see the IJC today as a front for politically
conservative governments that have no real commitment to the water
quality agreements.
The IJC was established for limited purposes of a quasi-judicial
nature. The Parties never intended to confer policy formulating or administrative powers on the IJC. But the Parties as an entity have seldom, if
ever, been confronted by a demanding or discontented Great Lakes con-
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stituency. Individual agencies such as the Corps of Engineers or the Fish
and Wildlife Service have faced the public in open hearings. But occasions
for face-to-face meetings with representatives of the Department of State
or Ministry of External Affairs have been virtually nonexistent. If the level
of public concern for the future of the Great Lakes continues to rise, how
will these institutional behaviors accommodate an increasingly active and
informed participatory democracy?
The IJC is more open to nongovernmental interposition than is the
International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) on MexicanUnited States transboundary affairs. The functions and personnel of
IBWC are largely technical, and in its areas of expertise the IBWC enjoys a
substantial degree of autonomy. 15 Mexico-United States transboundary
institutions are treated at length in this volume by Alberto Szekely. In the
future the omnipresence of the desert might become an integrative concern in this region, especially as more is learned regarding the advantages
of its ecological resources.
The geopolitical and functional circumstances of the two commissions differ to a degree that complicates comparison of their status. Both
attract predatory tendencies in the administrative agencies of the United
States, but each has successfully withstood covert efforts to transfer functions to "line" agencies. The national agencies are likely to be more successful in opposing any significant expansion of commission autonomy
than in reducing its present status. But the Canadian and Mexican transboundary situations differ in the presence of a much larger and aggressive
NGO constituency for Canadian-American transboundary Affairs, especially in relation to the Great Lakes. Moreover the Water Quality Agreements beyond their technical aspects involve a broader range of policy
issues than does the Mexican-United States Water Treaty of 1944.

CONJECTURAL ALTERNATIVES
This broad mandate of mission and continuing growth of public
concern raises doubt and uncertainty over whether the present binational
arrangements for attaining the objectives of the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreements are adequate to the task. This is not to say that present
arrangements are inadequate or that some other institutional structure, if
feasible, would achieve more rapid results. Uncertainty results from the
absence of a balance sheet on the state of the lakes, comparing needs,
objectives, accomplishments, and efforts under way. Doubt also follows
15. N. Smith, TransboundaryRelationsand Acid Rain: New York's Memorandum of Understanding with Quebec and Ontario, 5 J. of Borderlands Studies 111-33 (Spring 1990); Paradiplomacy
Between the U.S. States and CanadianProvinces:The Case of Acid Rain Memoranda of Understanding, 3 J. Borderland Studies 13-38 (Spring 1988).
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from a pervasive distrust of government. It reflects the experience of people with official rhetoric that in practice does not always mean what it
appears to mean; hence, there appears to be a credibility gap between governmental declarations of public goals and quiet concessions to self-seeking private interests.
Thus far there has been less popular distrust of the International
Joint Commission than of the intentions and performance of the Parties.
The IJC appears to have given high priority to an assessment of the state of
the lakes, but it remains to be seen how this priority will be implemented,
and to what effect. An adequate assessment would need to be comprehensive and easily updated. Computer technology could provide a dynamic
format; the large and complex task would be the marshaling and reconciling of relevant data from a multiplicity of sources. How this assessment
might be organized, staffed, and funded is another uncertainty. Moreover,
not everyone concerned would agree that such a comprehensive assessment is needed, and it would require an extraordinary competence in
interdisciplinary synthesis, which is precisely the capability in which our
reductionist science is least proficient.
What is certain, however, is that the cleansing, rehabilitation, and
protection of the lakes remains an unfinished and formidable task.
Despite progress, significant contamination of the lakes from both industrial and municipal point sources continues. The nonpoint source problems remain unresolved in practice and would especially require changes
in agriculture, which governments are reluctant to contemplate. Local officials are generally uncomfortable in resisting demands from riparian
property owners for the "right" to line lakes with tax-yielding marinas,
motels, and summer cottages. Citizens of some communities (e.g., Erie,
Pennsylvania) have discovered that some local officials were prepared to
barter away public access to the lake for jobs and revenues anticipated
from private development. These are only a few examples to illustrate the
need of a system of governance for the Great Lakes that finds an appropriate balance between basinwide policies and controls and local autonomy
and options.
Looking to the future institutional options for governance of the
Great Lakes, five alternatives may be identified. None but the fifth are
wholly mutually exclusive, and each might be adopted progressively
were there sufficient popular persuasion of the need for more comprehensive and coordinative control. In summary they are:
1. No significant change. Present structure is satisfactory.
2. Each Party establishes or strengthens its own coordinative
authority.
3. The IJC and its Great Lakes Regional Office are given carefully
limited coordinative responsibilities.
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4. The IJC is given executive powers with selective assumption
of national agency initiatives in policymaking.
5. An autonomous Great Lakes Authority is established by
treaty, advised by a representative assembly, and with limited
power to raise revenues and to issue and enforce regulations.
Comment on the implications of these issues follows.
1. No significant change. The conservatism of the Parties on
environmental issues and considerations of sovereignty tend to reinforce a
general status quo, with no more than incremental change among agencies reflective of changes in national legislation (e. g., the United States
Clean Air Act of 1990). However, if more than a primus inter pares relationship among lead agencies appears needed, alternative (2) may be adopted.
2. National coordinative authority. If interagency collaboration
demonstrably fails to achieve the degree of coordination needed to fulfill
national commitments under the Water Quality Agreements, each Party
may establish a new supra-departmental coordinative authority. Alternatively this coordinative responsibility might be laid on an existing agency
such as the Office of Management and Budget, or the Environmental Protection Agency in the USA, or the Department of Finance, or Environment
Canada in Canada. The EPA appears to be approaching the status of coordinator in the USA.
3. Upgrading the Great Lakes Regional Office. If consolidation
of policy responsibilities by each Party still failed to achieve basinwide
coordination, or possibly made binational cooperation more difficult, the
Parties might be importuned to confer increased, but specified and limited, coordinative authority on the IJC. To meet this challenge, the IJC
might logically enlarge the role of the Great Lakes Regional Office without
fundamentally changing its character as a research and investigating arm
of the Commission. In fact, the IJC since 1990 has seemed intent on downgrading, if not abolishing, the Great Lakes Regional Office at Windsor,
Ontario. It has closed its science library (transferred to the University of
Windsor), given up its conference rooms, and demoralized its professional
staff. Its rationale of fiscal necessity is specious by the most charitable
standards. The Canadian division of IJC under spent its budget at the time
of these changes by more than the so-called "savings" gained by the closures. As for use of the research library, the commissioners are neither scientists nor administrators and are hardly competent judges of the uses
and usefulness of the library for the work of the Great Lakes Regional
Office.
4. An IJC with executive powers. An extension of the foregoing
alternative would be the transformation of the IJC into an operative regulatory agency. Under this alternative the Commission would become a
governing board with an executive office to carry out its policies. The Par-
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ties would doubtless retain, in some form, a veto over IJC decisions and
would define the area in which the Commission could exercise autonomous decisionmaking. Under this scenario the Great Lakes Regional
Office would acquire administrative powers and responsibilities in addition to its present functions of research, analysis, and reporting. Coordination of basinwide monitoring would very likely become a Regional Office
function. This alternative could emerge as the culmination of a progressive incremental process of reconciling and consolidating binational planning and decisionmaking for the Great Lakes. It would be the most
integrated of the relatively conservative alternatives for managing the
protection and restoration of the Great Lakes ecosystems.
5. A fifth is the least probable. Yet history records many
improbabilities that, in retrospect, appear as logical consequences of
developments that, when they occurred, were not perceived as tending
sequentially toward basic change. Preconditions for change may be
present for a long time before some catalyzing or catastrophic event sets
off a radical reconfiguration of political institutions. Thus changes previously regarded as improbable to impossible may rapidly become politically acceptable. The history of our times is filled with such unforeseen
eventualities.
This is next to the least probable scenario, as long as IJC commissioners are appointed largely for faithful political partisanship. There
have been some able and conscientious commissioners, Canadian and
American. But many have had neither knowledge nor experience with
Great Lakes issues. The tests of suitability for appointments to the IJC
employed by the chief executives of Canada and the United States are reliable indicators of the seriousness of their concern for the lakes. For the
United States commissioners in recent years the functions expected of
political appointees appear to be to hold commitments in check and to see
that nothing occurs that could embarrass the President.
This fifth alternative would restructure the governance of the
Great Lakes upon the basis of a new international treaty supplementing,
extending, and in effect replacing the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 and
all subsequent binational agreements. It would constitute a new institutional approach to management for the lakes in which the Parties would
merge some of their respective sovereignties in a quasi-autonomous agent
which we might call the Great Lakes International Authority. The Authority would be an administrative agent of the Parties with power to coordinate the activities of national and subnational agencies impacting upon
the Great Lakes Basin ecosystems. It might be complemented by an assembly representative of the official jurisdictions in the Great Lakes and of the
public at large. In this respect it would resemble the Parliament of Europe
as an issue-raising, deliberating, proposal-formulating body, supplementing but not replacing national, state, and provincial legislative bodies.
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This alternative would be elected as a consequence of a coalescence of public and official opinion that a more integrative and focused
institutional arrangement was necessary to attain the goals of the Water
Quality Agreements and subsequent objectives. The Authority would neither necessarily nor probably replace the IJC, which could retain its traditional supervisory role over the Great Lakes, and, in any case, would have
continuing surveillance over the rest of the Canadian-American boundary
waters, a responsibility more likely to increase than to diminish.
Ours is an age of improbability. From our understanding of the
origin and structure of the cosmos to the nature of the microorganismic
world, assumptions and beliefs have been challenged, some shattered by
advances in knowledge. Unforeseen events in politics and economics
have occurred on a scale and at a rate that has taxed the ability of nearly all
institutions to accommodate them. Although ecological change in the
Great Lakes Basin has been going on for more than a century, public
awareness of its destructive and impoverishing consequences has been
slow to materialize. Now, however, there has been a rapid escalation of
organized popular concern. Will the gradual institutional adjustments
made by the Parties to meet earlier perceptions of need be sufficient to satisfy an expanding and intensifying public concern?
Under conditions regarded as 'normal,' institutions of law and
government are especially resistant to change. Institutional conservatism
is 'normally' conducive to social stability; law and government are ligaments that bind diverse communities into coherent and predictable relationships. Political leaders tend, therefore, to be cautious in introducing
innovative changes in institutional arrangements. Of course, dramatic
events may induce dramatic responses, but political reaction to slow-moving incremental changes is 'normally' incremental and retarded. Circumstances may build toward a fundamental institutional change that awaits
a triggering event for its occurrence.
A dramatic disaster may not be as ecologically significant as may
massive, invisible, cumulative contamination of the lakes. But dramatic
events can catalyze concern in a way that chronic degrading trends will
not. The possibility of a catastrophic oil or chemical spill in the lakes or the
rupture of a shoreline nuclear reactor has been foreseen by members of the
IJC's Science Advisory Board. But even in an age of improbability, it is difficult for governments to take action to forestall possible but improbable
events. In official choice among priorities, the less certain is likely to lose
in competition with the presently evident. Because presently recognized
hazards have been discovered and addressed incrementally, no comprehensive, coherent institutional response has been made to the challenge of
environmental degradation. The principle of a basinwide ecosystem
approach to management for the lakes has been adopted by the Parties,
but practice is still largely issue specific and incremental. Opinion is
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divided over whether a more focused and cohesive institutional response
is needed and, if so, how to obtain it.
A SCENARIO
We now look ahead to an as yet unnamed year in the not too distant future when a maritime collision and massive oil-chemical spill
occurred below Port Huron in the St. Clair River. The spill occurred near
midnight on December 31 and was attributed to a navigational miscalculation possibly induced by an alcohol-related human error. In our New
Year's Eve oil spill, a Coast Guard duty officer in the communication
response chain suffered an upset stomach that required an unforeseen
sojourn in the bathroom. Expecting to be away from his desk for only a
few minutes, he took his telephone off the hook, thus breaking communication long enough for the oil spill to gain additional time to move unobstructedly downstream. His sojourn in the bathroom was longer than
expected. But even with uninterrupted response, there is slight possibility
for more than a token 'cleanup' of an oil spill in open water. When the
public realizes this and the spill directly affects a populous area, a vociferous public reaction may be expected. Unaffected communities may join in
through apprehension over possibilities. Because of bad weather, the time
of night, and preoccupation with New Year's Eve festivities, the spill was
not detected until it had moved rapidly downstream through Lake St.
Clair into the Detroit River and was approaching Lake Erie. By this time
serious damage had been done to water intakes and shoreline installations. By noon on January 1 authorities in Canada and the United States
had been alerted, and efforts to contain the spill were being set in motion.
The United States Coast Guard had contingency plans for such an event,
but the time, place, and circumstances of its occurrence could hardly have
been worse. Bad weather with poor visibility, communications failure,
and inevitable delays in locating and mobilizing personnel and equipment on a major holiday frustrated efforts to prevent the spill from entering Lake Erie. It was a quintessential exemplification of Murphy's
proverbial law that anything that can happen, given time, will happen.
Planning and acting are different forms of behavior and the best
laid plans may fail in action if circumstances prove inconsistent with
expectations. If the potential for accident is inherent in a techno-social system, later if not sooner, it may be expected to occur, and likely under circumstances not regarded as probable in contingency planning. The
human tendency is to attribute the cause of an accident to a specific exceptional event and to fail to perceive the broader circumstances that made
the accident a probability.
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The possibility of catastrophic oil spills on the Great Lakes had
been projected in a report from Carnegie Mellon University and by the
Public Review Panel on Tanker Safety and Marine Spills Response Capability for the government of Canada. The Great Lakes Critical Programs
Act of 1990 (Public Law No. 101-596, amending the Federal Water Pollution Control Act) had directed the EPA Great Lakes National Programs
Office in cooperation with the Coast Guard and consultation with the
Great Lakes states to " identify areas within the Great Lakes which are
likely to experience numerous or voluminous spills of oil or other hazardous materials, [and] identify weaknesses in Federal and State programs
and systems to prevent and respond to such spills." 16 Unfortunately
implementation of this admonition required inter-jurisdictional coordination, which invariably takes time. Moreover, the United States Congress
does not legislate for Canada. To plan and make operational "systems to
prevent and respond to such spills" required placing restrictions on shipping and industrial practices which also required additional legislation
(and persuasion) on both sides of the international border. Consequently
the United States agencies focused on response while working on prevention. When the spill occurred, the importune circumstances delayed effective response. Good intentions proved poor insurance against untimely
disaster.
Public reaction was explosive. Television crews were hampered
by the weather, but news media descriptions and comments were widespread. Press coverage aroused apprehension in the cities of the lower
lakes, dependent upon lake water for domestic and industrial purposes.
For the news media the big question was who to blame. The humans
immediately responsible were soon identified, but nearly as soon the systemic nature of the catastrophe became clear. The news media concluded
that beyond and indeed including the initial event, all of the agencies
charged with protecting the lakes had some share in responsibility for its
occurrence. The predictable response of the nongovernmental environmental organizations was "We warned that this might happen; we told
you SO."
Few people are immune to embarrassment, but public officials,
especially elected officials, have an acute aversion to public humiliation.
Under the stress of popular excitement and indignation, and pertinacious
questioning by the news media, politicians often make commitments that
they could not previously have been persuaded to make. The cumulative
public frustration with unfulfilled objectives and with the gap between
official protestation and performance was triggered into action by a single
horrendous event that catalyzed a broad range of concerns into demand
for something more effectual than government business as usual. Thus
16. 104 Stat. 3001 tit. 1 (5) (Spills of Oils and Hazardous Materials).
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members of Parliament and Congress, along with state and provincial legislators, were soon calling for a binational conference on the status and
future of the Great Lakes.
Events moved rapidly beyond control of the IJC and the government agencies. The IJC sought center stage by endorsing the idea of a binational conference, which indeed had been proposed some years earlier
by United States IJC member Charles Ross. But the IJC and the Parties had
lost credibility though their apparent efforts to downgrade if not abolish
the Great Lakes Regional Office. They were unprepared to take any constructive initiative beyond endorsing a conference. The administrative
agencies in Ottawa and Washington were constrained by indecision and
political uncertainty. Their credibility was compromised by a popular perception that their fractional approach to protection of the lakes was part of
the problem. And so, in response to a request by the governments, the IJC
convened a binational conference of elective and nongovernmental representatives from the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin states and provinces
in which agency personnel participated only in resource and advisory
capacities. There was general agreement that although information from
the agencies was essential to the work of the conference, their participation in conference deliberations would risk conflict of interest.
In our scenario, the International Conference on the Future of the
Lakes (ICFL) convened in early summer on Mackinaw Island, sixteen
months after the New Year's Eve spill. During the intervening months a
preparatory commission had been at work, following a pattern previously
set for the environmental conferences of the United Nations (e.g., Stockholm 1972 and Rio de Janeiro 1992). Carefully planned meetings were
held in principal cities around the lakes, with local public officials, citizens, and Native American communities, especially in designated Areas
of Concern for which Remedial Action Plans had been, or were being,
developed. When convened, the Conference had before it three major documents to consider: (1) a new Draft Treaty and Protocol for the Great
Lakes, (2) an Action Plan and (3) a Financial Plan.
The Treaty and Protocol constituted, in effect, a constitution for
the Great Lakes. The Protocol provided a frame for governance consisting
of an elective Assembly for the lakes, meeting once annually to receive
and consider reports, hear representatives of the public, review progress,
and make recommendations. Its functions were deliberative, not legislative, and in its own sphere it resembled the Parliament of Europe. The Protocol provided an administrative structure to coordinate and direct the
Action Plan under the general supervision of a reconstituted IJC, implementing and extending execution of the Remedial Action Plans, and programming new remedial and protective initiatives and research priorities.
Finally there was a Financial Plan to provide basic revenues for the Great
Lakes International Authority. The Plan authorized the levying of speci-
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fled revenues (e.g., on shipping, shoreline development, and effluent discharge) and the issuance of revenue bonds.
There was precedent for a set of principles for custody of the
lakes. Charters for the Great Lakes had been adopted by the Governors of
the Great Lakes States and Provinces (1984), and proposed by Professor
Lester W. Milbrath in 1988 and by the Rawson Academy of Aquatic Science in 1989.17 Although these documents did not call for the establishment of a new basinwide coordinative agency, mechanisms far more
effective in coordination were implicit in their terms. Drawing upon these
preceding declarations the Conference incorporated their principles in a
definitive document suitable for formal adoption by the two national governments. The new authority did not generally duplicate or preempt the
existing operative responsibility of the government agencies, but it provided a central supervisory and coordinative capability hitherto lacking in
the Great Lakes Basin.
And so the Great Lakes entered a new phase of governance. The
Conference report was adopted by the Parliament of Canada and the Congress of the United States, and the treaty was ratified with surprisingly little opposition. Headquarters for the new Authority were constructed on
an island in the Detroit River, midway between the Ontario and Michigan
shores, and connected by rapid transit with Detroit and Windsor. Here, in
effect, was the capital of a new kind of political regime for the Great Lakes.
The government agencies continued to perform most of their previous functions, but under the coordinative supervision of the Authority
monitored by the IJC. Most questions of law and adjudication remained
with the judiciaries of the respective countries. In lieu of a court for the
Great Lakes, the treaty provided for an Office of Legal Affairs for fact-finding and advisory opinions on points of law and for mediation and arbitration services. This office also performed a function similar to that of the
Swedish Ombudsman. Thus conflict resolution was emphasized in prefer17. See D. Minton, Toward a More Accountable Process, and G. Francis, Great Lakes Governance and the Ecosystem Approach: What Next? in Caldwell, supra, note 1. See also L. Milbrath,
A Governance Structure Designed to Learn Would Better Protect the Great Lakes Ecosystem in Caldwell, supranote 1, at 141-67. Milbrath proposes a Great Lakes Futures Review Board, a Great
Lakes Court and a Charter declaring principles. He also suggests an voluntary assessment of
one-tenth of one percent on the annual budgets of the principal jurisdictions in the region. See
also Rawson Academy of Aquatic Science: Towards an Ecosystem Charter for the Great
Lakes-St. Lawrence (Sept. 1989). Most writers on institutional arrangements for the Great
Lakes consider any significant change in international jurisdictional arrangements to be
impractical and impolitic. The opinion is widely held that the Boundary Waters Treaty of
1909 is the best agreement that could be obtained. Yet the Water Quality Agreements have
clearly enlarged its dimensions, or at least the interpretation of its provisions. Moreover, the
Free Trade Agreement was widely viewed as impractical until it became a fact. When the
European Economic Community was negotiated, only a visionary could have foreseen the
Community of today and the Single European Act. Scenario 5 is projected into a future and
does not intimate a development that could be expected tomorrow.
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ence to litigation. No new large bureaucracy was created, but some transfers of agency positions and personnel to the new authority did occur.
IN CONCLUSION
The foregoing scenario is obviously a piece of political science fiction. It may or may not be prophetic. But who can safely predict the future
in an age of improbability? Fiction may be an aid to foresight when conventional modes of prediction are not reliable. Intuitive judgments,
informed by historical experience and judicious assessment of trends,
have sometimes proved to be right. It has been the experience of mankind
that great changes often come about unobtrusively, incrementally, and
contrary to the conventional wisdom of the day. When a progressive
sequence of events suddenly comes to term, it is often the practical minds
preoccupied with day-to-day concerns that are most taken by surprise. No
one has better described this syndrome of misplaced attention than Alexis
de Tocqueville in the opening lines of his history of the French Revolution.
He wrote:
I1n'y rien de plus propre a rappeler les philosophes et
les hommes d'Etat a la modestie que 1'histoire de notre
Revolution; car il n'y eut jamais d'evenements plus
grands, conduit de plus loin, mieux prepares et moins
prevus.
English Translation
Nothing is better fitted to give a lesson in modesty to
philosophers and statesmen than the history of the
French Revolution; for never were there events more
important, longer
in ripening, more fully prepared, or
18
less foreseen.
A revolution in the management of human activities affecting the
Great Lakes is less momentous than is a national revolution. Yet old
regimes unable to adapt to changing needs and circumstances risk
replacement. The authorities in charge are usually the last to see the need
for change. Our scenario is consistent with a worldwide tendency to reallocate responsibilities hitherto claimed by national states, to multinational
or localized bodies. All-purpose national sovereignties seem unable to
respond adequately to many of the challenges of a new post-modem age.
Thus new institutions for governance, but less than governments, have
18. A. de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution, On the State of Society in
FranceBefore the Revolution in 1789; andon the Causes which led to that Event 26 (. Murray trans.,
1856).
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been emerging under the general concept of regime theory. The Great
Lakes International Authority exemplifies this tendency, which is to fill
the unoccupied area of policy and action where two or more sovereign
states meet. The future of the Great Lakes may be determined by the new
concept of governance.

